



Mapping the web of influence: Conflict of interest and the corporate capture of science, civil society and policy

David Miller
Professor of Sociology
Co-Director Public Interest Investigations

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Health governance in the public interest? WHO redefines conflicts of interest and risks undermining public health mandates

Geneva Press Club/Club Suisse de la Presse
Route de Ferney, Genève




Addictions Web of Influence: Data and methods

- **EU level - Social Network Analysis Mapping Exercise** of the organisational structure of industry influence activities – Food, alcohol, tobacco, gambling.
- **Compiled data from various public sources** on memberships, interlocks and affiliations (trade association directory, expert group register, transparency register, organisational website)
- Supplemented by political economy, publication analysis, interviews, grey materials, leaked and FoI documents



The web of influence: Industry networks



- Industrial actors engage in a range of tactics and strategies in order to influence the policy process.
- Corporations and their proxies form complex networks across multiple levels of governance in order to develop and extend favourable trading conditions.
- Such strategies are not always successful, but they are comprehensively and consciously planned and relatively unexplored.



Multiple corporate voices



17 memberships



International Center for Alcohol Policies
Analysis. Balance. Partnership.



DIAGEO

EU Alcohol and Health Forum



Multiple corporate voices (Nestle)

Nestle

Lobby group/think tank

Advertising Education Forum
Centre for European Policy Studies

European Policy Centre
European Roundtable of Industrialists
European Food Information Council
Responsible Advertising and Children
SAI Platform – Sustainable Agriculture Initiative
International Life Science Institute

Lobby firm

Weber Shandwick

Policy fora

High Level Forum for a Better Functioning Food Supply Chain
EU Platform for Action on Diet, Physical Activity and Health
European Alliance for Apprenticeships
Advisory Group on Food Waste
European Food Sustainable Consumption and Production Round Table

Trade Associations

European Brands Association
Association of chocolate, biscuit and confectionery industries of the European Union
European Cereal Breakfast Association
Committee of Industrial Users of Sugar
Culinaria Europe
European Coffee federation
European Dairy Association
European Federation of Bottled Water
European Association of Dairy Trade
European Ice Cream Association
European Organization for Packaging and the Environment
Medical Nutrition International
Specialised Nutrition Europe
European Pet Food Industry
FoodDrinkEurope
Union of European Beverages Associations
World Federation of Advertisers





Multiple corporate voices (Coca Cola)

Coca cola

Lobby groups/think tanks

CSR Europe - The European business network for CSR
 Transatlantic Policy Network
 Advertising Education Forum
 Friends of Europe
 EU Pledge
 European Food & Drink Council
 International Life Science Institute

Lobby firms

Interel European Affairs (since 11/2013)
 EPPA SA
 EU Issue Tracker / Shungham Information
 Dods

Peak business associations

American Chamber of Commerce to the EU
 British Chamber of Commerce in Belgium

Policy fora

EU Platform on Physical Activity, Diet and Health

Trade associations

European Fruit Juice Association
 European Brands Association
 Beverage Industry Environmental Roundtable
 Better Sugarcane Initiative
 Committee of Industrial Users of Sugar
 European Food Law Association
 European Bioplastics
 European Organization for Packaging and the Environment
 European Technical Caramel Association
 European Water Partnership
 FoodDrinkEurope
 International Sweeteners Association
 PET user alliance
 Refrigerants, Naturally!
 SAI - Sustainable Agriculture Initiative
 Sustainability Consortium
 Union of European Beverages Associations
 World Federation of Advertisers





Multiple corporate voices (Philip Morris)

Philip Morris

Trade Associations

AmCham EU
 The American European Community Association (AECA)
 International Trademark Association
 BusinessEurope
 European Smokeless Tobacco Council
 British Chamber of Commerce
 VBO-FBE
 APRAM
 LES France
 European Communities Trade Mark Association
 MARQUES
 AmCham Germany
 Bund für Lebensmittelrecht & Lebensmittelkunde
 Europäischer Wirtschaftssenat
 Wirtschaftsbeirat der Union e.V.
 American Chamber of Commerce of Estonia
 American Lithuanian Business Council
 Lithuanian Confederation of Industrialists,
 Investors' Forum

American Chamber of Commerce of Lithuania

AmCham Spain
 Confederacion Espanola de Organizaciones Empresariales
 Spanish Tobacco Roundtable
 Ass. Industrial Portuguesa
 Centromarca
 Unindustria (Confindustria)
 Economiesuisse

Lobby group/think tank

Tobacco Industry Platform
 Trans-Atlantic Business Council (TABC),
 European Policy Centre (EPC),
 Kangaroo Group,
 European Risk Forum (ERF),
 Public Affairs Council

Lobby firm

CNC - Communications & Network Consulting AG
 FELULA SA
 Pandic



PHILIP MORRIS

Multiple corporate voices

- **Civil Society capture**
 - Astroturf
 - Think tanks
 - CSR
 - Advertising/marketing/media
- **Science Capture**
- **Policy Capture**




Social movements from above and below

‘the collective agency of dominant groups to reproduce or extend their power and hegemonic positions’ (Cox and Nilsen, 2014).

But:


There are also social movements from above that try and appear as if they are ‘from below’



Science and civil society capture

- The purpose of 'front groups' and 'astroturf' is to give the erroneous impression that business views are held by a range of groups
- They require to be deceptive and secretive to work.





Think tanks and policy planning

- EPC – covert lobbyist for Big tobacco (and Food and Alcohol)
- Kangaroo Group – key avenue for Tobacco access to policy makers
- ICAP – collective think tank for big alcohol
- ECPA and FoE – foster collective interests of big business including addiction related business
- More transparency needed



KANGAROO GROUP AISBL
FREE MOVEMENT
AND SECURITY




International Center for Alcohol Policies
Analysis. Balance. Partnership.



Marketing and advertising industry as public health challenges

- Addictive industries closely aligned with the advertising/marketing/ sponsorship/ media and PR industries
- Close working relationships to defend commercial communications against regulation;
- Significant investment in academics to attack public health messages





Corporate Social Responsibility

- 2004/6 - Drinkaware
- 2014 - Foundation for AAR
- 2015 - IARD
- 2007 – Gambleware
- CSR related strongly to corporate priorities and used to pursue them.
- Strong need to move beyond ‘voluntary’ approaches.



Portman
Group



drinkaware.co.uk
for the facts about alcohol

THE
**CENTURY
COUNCIL**
FIGHTING DRUNK DRIVING
& UNDERAGE DRINKING



FOUNDATION FOR
**ADVANCING ALCOHOL
RESPONSIBILITY.ORG**



International Center for Alcohol Policies
Analysis. Balance. Partnership.



IARD
INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCE FOR
RESPONSIBLE DRINKING

gambleaware.co.uk
GAMBLE RESPONSIBLY

Corporate capture of science

Corporate funding of science

- Lack of transparency and monitoring of conflict of interests
- Corporate funding of science related groupings: eg ILSI, EUFIC, IFIC
- Contaminate the supply of expertise, undermine science based assessments – eg EFSA
- Lack of understanding and acceptance of conflict of interest rules among scientists and journals
- Inadequate monitoring of conflict of interest mechanisms



Policy capture- Partnership governance

- The advent of 'partnership' governance where public policy is not simply 'influenced' but is actually co-created and delivered by the private sector.
- This raises new questions about industrial actors and their relations with policy makers. In particular questions about transparency and conflict of interest become of heightened importance.
- Enshrines 'voluntary' approaches to compliance.
- Binding regulation, not co-regulation needed



Partnership Agreement: Scottish Executive and the alcohol industry

signatories:

- Scottish Executive
- Scotch Whisky Association
- Tennents
- Diageo
- Scottish & Newcastle
- Scottish Retail Consortium
- Scottish Licensed Trade Association
- BII Scotland
- Scottish Beer & Pub Association
- Scottish Grocers' Federation
- Wine & Spirits Trade Association
- Gin & Vodka Association
- National Association of Cider Makers



EU Platform on Diet,
Physical Activity and Health

Policy capture: The Revolving Door

- ‘Ensuring that the integrity of government decision-making is not compromised by public officials’ private interests is a growing public concern. New forms of partnership between government and the private and non-profit sectors present new challenges for policy-makers and public managers.’ (OECD, 2010)
- EU institutions fail to take the revolving door seriously and fail to take effective action to block it. (Corporate Europe Observatory)
- European Food Standards Agency - ongoing issues include:
 - Revolving door - EUFIC, ILSI
 - More than 50% of experts with conflicts
 - Inadequate mechanisms for gathering, monitoring and managing conflicts.



Transparency and conflict of interest in science

A conflict of interest exists when professional judgment concerning a primary interest... may be influenced by a secondary interest (such as financial gain). Perceptions of conflict of interest are as important as actual conflicts of interest.

Financial relationships (such as employment, consultancies, stock ownership or options, honoraria, patents, and paid expert testimony) are the most easily identifiable conflicts of interest and the most likely to undermine the credibility of the journal, the authors, and of science itself. However, conflicts can occur for other reasons, such as personal relationships or rivalries, academic competition, and intellectual beliefs.

(International Committee of Medical Journal Editors 2013)



Transparency and conflict of interest in science

Babor and Miller (2014: 342) note that academic work on the relation between declared interests and findings has been:

‘ironically made possible in part by COI declaration policies instituted by the major biomedical journals.’

However:

- Current policies assume that authors will be honest.
- Mechanisms to investigate, police and monitor policies limited.




Transparency

Case of the EU Transparency register

- Created 2011
- Voluntary
- 'incomplete and inconsistent'

The case of Philip Morris (2013)

- Code of conduct requires 'ensure... information...complete, up-to-date and not misleading'
- Leaked documents said to show significant under-reporting of activity, staff and spending.



The case the International Life Science Institute (ILSI)

ILSI not registered

Only four companies register ILSI membership

Current ILSI Europe Members

Abbott Nutrition	Institut Mérieux	Puratos Group
ADM - Rudolf Wild	Johnson & Johnson EAME	Red Bull
Ajinomoto Europe	Kao Corporation	Roquette Group
Arla Foods	Kikkoman Foods Europe	Sanofi-Aventis R&D
Barilla G&R Fratelli	Lonza	Schwabegroup
BASF SE	Luigi Lavazza	Sealed Air
Bunge Europe	Mars	Sensus
Cargill	McDonald's Corporation	Südzucker/BENEO Group
Chr. Hansen	Mead Johnson Nutrition	Swiss Quality Testing Services - SQTS
Cosucra Groupe Warcoing	Merck Consumer Healthcare	Tate & Lyle Ingredients
Danone	Mondelēz International	Tereos
Dow Europe	Monsanto Europe	Tetra Pak
DSM	Nestlé	The Coca-Cola Company
DuPont de Nemours	Nexira	The Valspar Corporation
Firmenich	PepsiCo International	Ülker Bisküvi
FrieslandCampina	Pfizer Consumer Healthcare	Unilever
General Mills	Pierre Fabre Dermo Cosmétique	WALA Heilmittel
Givaudan International	Premier Foods	Yakult Europe
Indoor Biotechnologies	Procter & Gamble	

Updated on 15 September 2015

Barilla G. e R. Fratelli (Barilla)

Identification number: 23808853344-79 | **Registration date:** 17/03/2010 | **Section:** II - In-house lobbyists and trade/business/professional associations

UNAFA) EU Semouliers **ILSI** Europe Marco Montanaro

Bunge Ltd (BEMEA)

Identification number: 30701218296-12 | **Registration date:** 09/03/2012 | **Section:** II - In-house lobbyists and trade/business/professional associations

Primary Food Processors) **ILSI** Europe Andreas Sommer

Danone

Identification number: 65744846168-89 | **Registration date:** 08/07/2011 | **Section:** II - In-house lobbyists and trade/business/professional associations

Infant Food Manufacturers **ILSI** - International Life Science

Tetra Pak International

Identification number: 7574443768-34 | **Registration date:** 11/12/2008 | **Section:** II - In-house lobbyists and trade/business/professional associations

Council) ILSC Europe (**International Life Science** Institute) FPE (Flexible

The case of EU Pledge

EU Pledge is not registered

Three companies register EU Pledge membership

More then 20 food companies are members

Danone

Identification number: 65744846168-89	Registration date: 08/07/2011	Section: II - In-house lobbyists and trade/business/professional associations
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European Food & Drink Council **EU Pledge** EUROPEAN - European Organisation

Landmark Public Policy Advisers Europe Ltd (Landmark Europe)

Identification number: 98945367035-89	Registration date: 27/10/2011	Section: I - Professional consultancies/law firms/self-employed consultants
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of European Sugar Users, **EU Pledge**, Food Sustainable Consumption

The Coca-Cola Company (Coca-Cola (NYSE: KO))

Identification number: 00475641564-03	Registration date: 23/04/2009	Section: II - In-house lobbyists and trade/business/professional associations
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European Food Law Association **EU Pledge** European Bioplastics European



supported by





Implications for Policy

- Multiple voices and points of access (including indirect routes); Policy makers often misled about interests behind groups.
- Partnership governance/self regulation should be replaced with public health measures.
- Need to recognise advertising/marketing/media industry powerful political actor, just like other addiction related industries.
- Case for managing role of harmful industries in policy - As in the Tobacco Framework Convention – exclude harmful industries.
- Need to join up ethics and transparency rules across governance levels.
- Need to heighten transparency and enhance conflict of interest rules so that public, civil society and indeed policy makers better informed on corporate strategy.
- Need to avoid conflict of interest or where it exists manage it out of the system.